Abstract The paper investigates the impact of historical legacies of the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires on demand for litigation in contemporary Romania in criminal cases. It finds that nowadays a key difference between these two historical zones is that in the Habsburg counties demand for litigation increases if the income goes up; in the Ottoman counties, however, the demand remains constant. Furthermore, the demand for litigation in poor counties is smaller in Habsburg than in Ottoman counties. We provide several explanations to this phenomenon and compare it to the anecdotal evidence of culture of judicial appeals in other countries.
of the countries of this region, characterized by strong historical heterogeneity in terms of formal and informal institutions, 1 makes it a fruitful field for investigation of how historical legacies shape the modern political and economic change. One of the most prominent historical legacies identified in the literature is that of the Habsburg and of the Ottoman Empires. These two empires ruled over most of the countries of Southeastern Europe for centuries and had very different organization of politics, public administration and economy. While the Habsburg Empire had a relatively effective bureaucracy and judiciary, the territories under Ottoman influence were characterized by an inefficient and corrupt public administration and court system (Sugar 1977; Jelavich 1983; Kann 1974) . Somewhat simplified, one could describe the Habsburg legacies to be associated with stronger rule of law, and Ottoman legacies with weaker rule of law, or even lack of thereof.
A number of papers investigate the Habsburg and the Ottoman legacies empirically (World Bank 2000; Roper and Fesnic 2003; Badescu and Sum 2005; Dimitrova-Grajzl 2007; Grosjean 2011; Grosjean and Senik 2011; Becker et al. 2011 ) and show that countries or regions, which were ruled by the Habsburg Empire in the past, are characterized by higher quality of contemporary economic institutions, lower corruption, stronger civil society, improved financial development and higher trust into the government today. In particular, Becker et al. (2011) show that Habsburg legacy is associated with higher trust in courts. However, the evidence on the persistence of legacies is still limited and, to some extent, contradictory (see Sindbaek and Hartmuth 2011) . In particular, it is not clear how the effect of historical legacies interacts with other contemporary variables. Thus, further research, investigating how Habsburg and Ottoman legacies affect various aspects of social and political life in the Southeastern European countries, is necessary.
A particularly interesting dimension is from this point of view the demand for litigation. While trust in justice measures the citizens' perception of the judicial impartiality, demand for litigation looks at how often the courts are actually used. This variable is important for social and economic development for several reasons. First, frequent use of courts could potentially serve as a proxy for greater legal experience and knowledge of the population. The lack of legal knowledge is an important obstacle for economic development. Second, frequent use of courts is associated with high economic costs drawing resources away from productive activity. Therefore, high demand for litigation may be associated with both advantages and disadvantages. Although there is empirical evidence regarding how Habsburg and Ottoman legacies influence the trust in courts, the link between this variable and the actual demand for litigation is ambiguous (see e.g. Hendley 2012 ). The lack of unambiguous mapping from trust to demand for litigation, combined 1 The concepts of ''institutions'' and ''culture'' have overlapping and multiple meaning in social sciences. In this paper we define institutions, in line with North (1990) , as rules constraining human behavior, both formal and informal. The notion of 'culture' is more debatable (Herrmann-Pillath 2010); we will use it to refer to particularly slow-moving (Williamson 2000; Roland 2004 ) and deeply rooted informal institutions, associated with collectively shared identities and mental models. Historical legacies are often associated with cultural effects, but they may also reflect themselves in formal institutions (e.g. survival of certain legal norms or concepts).
with importance of the latter, makes investigation of determinants of demand for litigation a relevant research task.
In this paper, we conduct a within-country study of Romanian regions in which we compare the effect of Habsburg and Ottoman legacies on demand for litigation by using a novel dataset of criminal cases in courts of appeal (tribunals). We use the fact that modern Romania was historically split between the Ottoman and the Habsburg Empires. The within-country analysis is useful, first, because it improves identification (Snyder 2001) , and second, because heterogeneity of formal law makes cross-country comparison of data on demand for litigation very difficult. We find that the historical legacies influence demand for litigation, but this influence depends upon the contemporary level of economic well-being in the county. In poor counties, Habsburg legacies are associated with significantly lower number of cases than Ottoman legacies; the increase of income results in the growing number of cases in the Habsburg counties, but not in the Ottoman ones. Our results seem to be consistent with what is sometimes called an appeal culture in the legal history; we provide qualitative evidence along these lines based on a number of interviews carried out in Romania.
As a secondary contribution, we also investigate the role of an additional factor potentially relevant for the persistence of historical legacies-the role of Hungarian ethnic minorities. Therefore, this paper also contributes to some recent research (Darden and Grzymala-Busse 2006; Wittenberg 2006; Peisakhin 2012) , which concentrates its attention on pinpointing the underlying causal mechanisms which link the past (historical legacies) to the present. We find, however, that ethnic minorities do not contribute to the effect we observe.
The paper proceeds as follows. The second section provides the theoretical basis for our discussion. The third section reviews the legal system of the Ottoman and the Habsburg territories of Romania and discusses possible channels of legacy persistence. The fourth section presents the dataset and the empirical approach we use. The fifths section reports the results and discusses our findings. The last section concludes.
Rule of law and demand for appeal in criminal justice
As a starting point of our discussion, it is necessary to devise a set of hypotheses predicting how rule of law should affect the likelihood of appeals in criminal cases. Specifically, we focus on how likely a defendant is to appeal. We consider two motives for decision-making: instrumental and expressive behavior. Instrumental behavior focuses on extracting wealth or maximizing income; expressive behavior focuses on choices reaffirming individual's identity (Lin 2002; Hillman 2010) . Institutional environment affects, first, the extent to which expressive or instrumental behavior is present, and second, the demand for appeal litigation, which can be derived from both types of behavior.
Consider first the instrumental demand for appeals. The Law and economics literature interprets a legal claim as an investment opportunity pursued by the litigant based on the expected benefits and costs (Landes 1971; Posner 1973;  Demand for litigation in the absence of traditions of rule of law Cornell 1990) . The costs of litigating are determined by case-specific circumstances, but also by institutional arrangements (Shavell 1982; Hughes and Snyder 1995; Chappe 2012; Barendrecht et al. 2006) . Thus, the appeals should be more likely if the costs of the appeal are lower than the possible improvement of the sentence the defendant can expect (e.g. reduction of the fine). In the absence of the rule of law, two arguments suggest that the appeal rate should be lower in criminal litigation. First, the lack of the rule of law makes it very difficult to fight against governmental predation in the court; criminal justice may become a tool of rent-extraction for bureaucrats in the law enforcement and interest groups connected to them, and the judges (themselves public servants) may be more inclined to side with their fellow bureaucrats, twisting the legal procedure. If that is the case, appeal is associated merely with waste of resources by the defendant, which has no chances against the bureaucracy virtually unconstrained by the law. Second, in an environment of weak rule of law the defendant may have higher chances at solving the problem she encounters by paying bribes or using informal connections in the bureaucracy rather than a formal appeal.
However, there are also reasons which make the appeals more likely in the presence of the weak rule of law from the point of view of instrumental behavior, at least as long as the costs of appeal are relatively small. Decisions of courts can be perceived as purely coincidental, random or influenced by extra-legal considerations (e.g. personality of the judge). Then the instrumental behaviour suggests that it makes sense to appeal even if from the legal perspective the chances of the case are very low-simply because the higher-level court can by random chance overrule the decisions of the lower level court (for example, because the judge interprets the law differently, because one managed to get better access to the judge, because the caseload is different etc.).
The effects of the rule of law on instrumental behaviour are likely to differ depending on income. In a rule of law environment, larger income implies larger litigation resources, which could make the appeal more successful at least in borderline cases. There exists a substantial literature, pioneered by Galanter (1977) , showing that litigation resources (and, particularly, income) increase the litigation success in jurisdictions with established rule of law.
2 Higher income should lead to more appeals (see also Jacobi 2009). 3 In the jurisdictions with deficits of the rule of law this effect should be weaker. On the one hand, larger resources provide even larger opportunities for bribes, which may be a much easier way to resolve the problem than the appeal process. On the other hand, appeals may attract attention of predatory bureaucracy. The use of legal procedures in societies with weak rule of law may be risky-they simply make the agent more visible for bureaucrats and thus increase the risk of expropriation. It may be cheaper to accept the rulings of the trial courts and to pay fines than to risk the unnecessary attention in case of appeals.
Finally, if the appeals are driven by the hope for a random chance of success (as hypothesized above), litigation resources should not affect the decision to make an appeal: the litigation outcome is perceived to be purely stochastic. Thus, we should expect growing number of appeals if the income increases in the societies with strong rule of law and stable or even lower number of appeals if the income increases in the societies with weak rule of law.
Expressive behaviour, as mentioned, serves primarily the goal of reaffirming one's identity. This identity could be reaffirmed in one's own eyes (in this case individuals extract utility from perceiving themselves as having certain identity), but also in the eyes of others. In terms of our research question, an appeal may be made to reaffirm one's self-identification as an honest person, who was unjustly sentenced by the court. Otherwise the individual accepts one's definition as a ''criminal''. Whether one actually wins the appeal or not may be unimportant-the very fact of appealing may be sufficient to reaffirm one's identity. This behaviour is more likely to happen if the general trust into courts is low: then individuals are more likely to interpret any decision of a trial court as unjust or merely as a tool of corruption in the hands of bureaucrats, and appeals may be seen as a signal of a particularly unjust decision, where further fight is necessary (as mentioned, even in the weak rule of law environment there is always a certain probability of just decision-by random chance). Expressive behaviour can be associated with subjective perception of justice: even if individual is aware that according to the law her chances of success are low, she still appeals because she perceives herself to be ''on the right side''. From the point of view of expressive behaviour appeals are unrelated to litigation resources or income, since success in the appeal court is not the main goal. Thus, expressive appeals should be more frequent in the environment of weak rule of law, and the number of expressive appeals should not change if income goes up.
Summing up, appeals in criminal jurisprudence could be less frequent due to the lack of the rule of law (because of lower chances to win against predatory bureaucracy and use of corruption instead of formal channels), but they could also be more frequent due to the lack of the rule of law (because of perception of jurisprudence as stochastic and larger role of expressive behaviour, leading to more appeals). It leads to empirical puzzle, which we investigate in this paper. Furthermore, demand for appeals in the rule of law environment should become more pronounced if income goes up; the demand for litigation in case of the lack of rule of law should not change depending on the income. These two statements provide two major hypotheses our paper intends to investigate, using the experience of Romania. The present-day Romanian territory has been an area of competition of great powers throughout its history. From the fourteenth century on, various parts of it have been under control of the Ottoman Empire, either directly, or through a system of suzerainty relations with local rulers. In late seventeenth century the north-western part of the country, Transylvania, 4 became part of the Habsburg monarchy; the eastern and southern parts of the country, Walachia and Moldavia, remained Ottoman vassal states. In the mid-nineteenth century Ottoman dominance was crippled; in 1859 Walachia and Moldavia were united into Romanian Kingdom, and in 1877 they declared independence from the Ottoman Empire. It was as late as after World War I that Transylvania was integrated in the Romanian state, alongside with Bukovina, another part of the Habsburg Empire, annexed as part of the divisions of Poland in the eightteenth century. Thus, both Habsburg and Ottoman rule over various parts of Romania stretched for at least several centuries, resulting in significant institutional and politico-economic differences.
The nature of the Habsburg and Ottoman rule, however, differed substantially. It is possible to speak about indirect Ottomanization and direct Magyarization. The principalities Wallachia and Moldavia under Ottoman suzerainty had certain autonomy. As vassal states, they had to pay high tribute (taxes) to the sultan but were able to keep their own nobility and princes (instead of Ottoman-Muslim governors) and their former financial, politico-administrative and judicial structures (Maxim 2001; Sugar 1977) . Romanian principalities did not adapt the Islamic legal institutions of the Ottoman Empire or the millet system of governance with multiple legal regimes for different ethnic groups. ''Ottomanization'' of Wallachia and Moldavia was done more indirectly with the help of Phanariots, Ottomans of Greek origins, who ruled the principalities and were appointed by the sultan. In contrast, Habsburg territories were fully incorporated into the Habsburg Empire and also more directly influenced by its assimilation, centralization and Magyarization practices (Seton-Watson 1925) . Among other things, this region was subject to the Hungarian and Austrian law and was ruled by relatively efficient and well-trained Habsburg bureaucracy (including judges). Habsburg territories were also subject to the modernization reforms implemented by the Danubian monarchy throughout the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries.
An important difference between the Ottoman principalities and the Habsburg provinces was that the former were subject to an extremely frequent change of rulers, while in the latter governors changed substantially less often. Table 1 summarizes the average tenure of Phanariot princes (hospodars) and Habsburg governors over one and a half centuries. On average, Phanariots ruled for 2.3-2.4 years; the tenure of the Habsburg governors with 6.6 years was almost three times longer. 5 This effect persisted throughout the period of Phanariot rule over Romanian principalities. In addition, Moldavia and Walachia occasionally came under the Russian and Habsburg occupations and were ruled by military commanders. These frequent changes affected the entire bureaucracy. In the Ottoman principalities members of the Divan 6 and high-raked judges and officials (boyars) changed almost every year, i.e. even more frequently than the princes (Wilkinson 1820) . The annual replacement of judges was described as a system of a ''perpetual renovation'' (Bargrave in Iorga 1933: 168) . Habsburg bureaucrats typically had a much longer tenure. These differences reflected themselves in the nature of the judicial process and the optimal appeal behavior.
Ottoman principalities
In the Ottoman principalities, the ''perpetual renovation'' of princes and boyars resulted in several pathologies of the rule of law and judicial practice (see Radulescu 1923; Kantemir 1771; Langeron de 1791 in Bezviconi 1947 . First, laws became instable and changed often with the change of princes. Second, laws became incoherent, i.e. several legal frameworks existed at the same time, producing different verdicts in similar cases (Zacharia 1840; Pertusier 1822) . Furthermore, the claim preclusion and the non-retroactivity principles were ignored (Radulescu 1923) . Third, most laws were complicated, unclear and difficult to understand for the majority of the subjects. Fourth, even if written rules existed, they were not respected in practice and allowed for biased interpretation by the Divan (Laurencon 1822: 17) . Ultimately, the frequently changing princes had absolute power over the judicial cases of their subjects, unrestricted by written law (Zacharia 1840; Georgescu 1991; Reinhard in Filitti et al. 2004; Iakovenko in Filitti et al. 2004; Thornton 1807; Wilkinson 1820) . Given this personal and legal instability, insecurity was high and long-term planning was hardly possible (Boner 1868: 471) . The judicial system of the Ottoman principalities suffered from corruption and arbitrariness. Since 1739 ''the title boyar became simply a rank, connected neither to the ownership of estates nor to position as a high official, but merely to the goodwill of the hospodar who granted it'' (Georgescu 1991: 102) . The position of a judge was often sold to the highest bidder, without any regard to the qualifications of the judge. Since the selection of judges was not merit-based, and the appointments were short-term, there was of course a very strong incentive to behave in a roving bandit (Olson 1993 ) style and to concentrate on rent extraction to the highest extent possible; they also had no incentive to acquire judicial knowledge and frequently lacked any judicial qualification. Unclear laws were frequently abused (Laurencon 1822: 16; Neigebaur 1848: 50 and 74) . Corruption remained an issue after unification of Romania (see Samuelson 1882: 101) .
At the same time, the law and the legal practices of the Ottoman principalities created strong incentives for appeals. In Wallachia and Moldova the right to appeal judicial verdicts was guaranteed by law. 7 The appeal of penal cases should be done in writing within a period of 60 days before the Divan. The sentence of the Divan if confirmed by the prince was final; however, it was always possible to re-appeal if the prince changed. The first modern code of Wallachia, the Legiuirea Caragea 7 The possibility to appeal lower court verdicts was introduced with the rule of Constantin Mavrocordat who adopted in 1740 a Constitution creating the first instance judges (ispravnics) and second instance judges (the judgments of the high boyars) (Mercure de France 1742:1512). The courts of high boyars (appeal courts) were also replicated by successive Moldavian and Wallachian rulers (e.g. Racoviţȃ, Ghica and Ipsilanti, see e.g. the description of Alexandru Ipsilanti judicial organization in Dariescu 2008) .
(Caragea's Law) (in force from 1818 to 1865) specified the following simple appeal procedure. Any judgment of a prince could be appealed by a prince, and in case it was annulled, appealed again by a third prince. Only after the trial was investigated by three princes, the appeal opportunity was considered as exhausted (Brailoui 1865:424-425 ; see also Zacharia 1840: 433-434) . In practice, cases could be reopened and reexamined under the same ruler or under his follower (Reinhard in Filitti et al. 2004: 253) . Thus, each change of the prince made the revision of the case possible and the decision of the previous prince could have been overruled. Every new prince was like a new lottery ticket for the person who lost a case at the lower court instance (although the chances to win this lottery were unequally distributed and depended upon bribes and informal connections). Since the princes changed very often, and in an unpredictable manner, appealing a court decision was a very attractive option. In addition, communication in and with courts could be done in Romanian (introduced already in 1727 by prince Ghica), also simplifying the appeal procedure; there was enough time (60 days) after the verdict to launch an appeal and appeals of small cases (until 500 piastre) could be made also orally (Neigebaur 1848: 49) .
One can see that the appeals were uncomplicated and cheap. Furthermore, appealing was stimulated by the princes themselves who encouraged their subjects to submit complaints about ''unjust'' verdicts and even small petty crimes, guaranteeing open doors for everybody (e.g. see Ioan Caragea's manifesto from 25 November 1812, cited in Urechia 1898: 276). The princes removed potential barriers to appeals: the judges were forbidden by law to curse and to constrain those litigants who wanted to launch an appeal (Onisor 1921: 244) . This was done because The calculation was made specifically for the following periods: Moldavia-1710 Moldavia- -1753 Moldavia- , 1753 Moldavia- -1801 Moldavia- , 1801 Moldavia- -1828 Walachia-1716 Walachia- -1752 Walachia- , 1752 Walachia- -1801 Walachia- , 1801 Walachia- -1828 Transylvania-1690 Transylvania- -1755 Transylvania- , 1755 Transylvania- -1787 Transylvania- , 1787 Transylvania- -1851 Transylvania- and 1851 Transylvania- -1867 . We use these specific time periods to accommodate the fact that tenure of rulers started at ended at different point of time (for example, György gróf Bánffy de Losonc ruled Transylvania in 1787-1822; thus, it would be unreasonable to artificially divide his rule into two periods in 1800). We include all rulers, including interim ones; if the ruler was had several discontinuous terms, each of them counts separately (this is very often the case for Romanian principalities: the same prince could have been appointed for several years, than leave his position for an number of years to another prince, and then return), since for our theoretical logic this type of appointments should produce the same effects leading to high number of appeals. Russian and Austrian occupation periods for Moldavia and Walachia do not count; Ottoman occupation period is included. The starting point for Walachia and Moldavia is the appointment of the first Phanariot prince; the ending point is the introduction of Organic Statute, which limited the Ottoman influence on the principalities. For Transylvania, the ending point is the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 the princes portrayed themself as representatives of Divine justice to whom every subject could make appeals if he was unfairly treated. By portraying themselves as just and fair -in contrast to the arbitrary and corrupt judges, the princes legitimized their rule (what was quite important due to frequent changes in power). In reality, however, the princes' justice was closely linked to the corruption and influence of boyars, producing highly biased decisions. From this point of view, there were strong incentives for the often indebted princes and their judges (zapcis/ispravnics at the first-instance courts, boyars at the Divan) to allow a high number of trials and appeals as every case in appeal was both an official (commission) and non-official (bribe) source of income (Bargrave in Iorga 1933; Reinhard in Filitti et al. 2004; Iakovenko in Filitti et al. 2004 ).
The outcome of the existing formal law and informal incentives was a perpetual growth of the number of appeals. More than 6,000 pending cases were produced at the Divan in the late eighteenth century. In the early nineteenth century the Divan accumulated already 21,807 pending cases (Neigebaur 1848: 74) . According to Laurencon (1822: 121) it could take several decades to resolve them. The established practice of resuming court cases despite a final verdict of the prince lead to the phenomenon of ''endless trials'' (Laurencon 1822: 30) . Occasionally, up to ten appeals of one and the same case were launched (Lagan 1828 in Holban 1930 . By doing so a litigant obtained a new chance to win the trial. The litigant could manipulate it by bribing an influential boyar, i.e. his personal advocate or protégé at the Divan. At the end, however, the outcome of the trial depended on the prince (who often did neither know Romanian nor the national customs-as mentioned, these were appointed rulers of Greek origin) or the great logofat (the Minister of Justice) who decided at his own discretion (Alexandresco 1898: 475).
Habsburg territories
Unlike the Ottoman principalities, in Transylvania the judicial system (including the appeal process) functioned relatively well, despite certain deficits. The main legal framework (Corpus Juris Hungarici), although lacking systematic interrelationships, remained relatively stable in its core and was expanded only gradually through judicial practice and imperial decrees (Springer 1840: 101; see Schuler von Libloy 1848) . While the legal framework still consisted of a mixture of royal decrees, privileges, statutes, case law, customary law, Hungarian, Saxon and Austrian law and was described as vague, ambiguous and unclear (Fessler 1825: 253-254; Springer 1840: 102) , two factors made a crucial difference from the Ottoman principalities. First, several Habsburg emperors, such as Maria Theresa, Charles III and Joseph II launched judicial and legal reforms (e.g. codification commissions to make the law more coherent, introduction of judge's and lawyer's examinations) which aimed to mitigate the existing pathologies (e.g. legal incoherence, differences in the quality of judges and lawyers, slow courts) (Fessler 1825: 254 and 524; von Domin-Petrushevecz 1869:187) . Furthermore, the Hungarian legal framework contained detailed regulations on judicial independence (non-removability of judges, immunity, non-transferability) and on different judicial conflicts of interest such as nepotism and corruption (incompatibility). Judicial accountability over Demand for litigation in the absence of traditions of rule of law judges and their performance (e.g. punctuality, respect of law) was assured by the Ministry of Justice and disciplinary councils (von Ferdinandy 1909) .
What is even more important is the fact that in the Habsburg case the pathologies of the legal system were mitigated by well-educated legal scholars, lawyers and judges. While lawsuits were occasionally delayed by the use of ''legal quibbling'' (Fessler 1825 : 264, see also Dauscher 1869 , the role of skilled lawyers was crucial during the appeal of cases. Often they could bring more light into the jungle of paragraphs and thus provided sophisticated, rule-based justice for their clients. The strong role of an educated judicial cast (inclusive legal scholars) reinforced the formalistic approach to justice through procedures and rules. For instance, notaries had an active rule during appeals. They head to read the sentences of the lower instance courts. All documents required stamps of seals. Furthermore, legal scholars (professors, judges, lawyers) were employed in codification and reform commissions, which were created to improve the system. In practice those litigants who had the better and more expensive lawyers had also a bigger chance to win the case. Thus launching an appeal with the help of a prestigious star lawyer increased the probability to win a case. In short, legal education and money mattered for obtaining justice; in the Ottoman case, as mentioned, it was only money-legally ignorant judges and boyars paid little respect to sophisticated judicial arguments.
The Habsburg territories also strikingly differed from the Ottoman ones in terms of the appellate litigation. Unlike Phanariots, who encouraged appeals, Habsburg law explicitly discouraged those and made appeals extremely costly. The appeal process was constrained by detailed, complicated and restrictive regulations which described in detail who, when and how appeals could be launched. It happened quite often that appeals were rejected on procedural grounds, for instance due to nonobservance of the regulations. The law contained numerous technical regulations to be followed in case of the appeal. Furthermore, in most penal trials (e.g. petty crime and violence) the judgment of the first instance court was not halted but executed (Paget 1850 ). There were fines imposed for appealing court decisions (von Jung 1818:321f; Schuler von Libloy 1848: 95; Sentz 1852: 387). Finally, the trials were associated with significant court costs (von Steeger 1834). Furthermore, trials were conducted either in Latin (until 1805) or in Hungarian. The existing legislation, which allowed everybody to use the native language during a trial, ''remained a dead letter'' in practice (Seton-Watson 1911: 161) . As Hungarian judges could not understand the Romanian-speaking parties and vice versa all necessary legal documents which were issued in another language than Hungarian had to be translated by the parties at their own expense. This included all correspondence with courts, the issue of indictments, verdicts, the representation by lawyers etc. (Popovici 1918: 135) .
As a result, the appeals were also substantially less frequent. According to a central register for Hungary from 1791, there were a total of 3,483 pending cases at the royal court (konigliche Tafel), i.e. the second highest court instance. Roughly half of these cases were appeal cases and the other half arrived there as first instance cases (Tabularprozesse). In 1810 there were 1875 first instance cases and 1,494 appeal cases at the royal court. The number of appeal cases was thus much lower than in the Ottoman Principalities and even in other Western countries (e.g. in 1795
Denmark and Norway had 25,521 and three years later 9,653 pending cases). The cumbersome and expensive appeal has prompted the low and high nobility to seek alternative dispute resolution, for instance through mediators or silent settlements (von Schwartner 1811:268-276).
Formal unification and persistence of informal institutions
After World War I, Habsburg and Ottoman parts were unified in a single Romanian state, which put substantial effort into centralizing the bureaucracy and the judiciary and to weaken the local elites. The new government systematically replaced judges and bureaucrats in Transylvania (Papp 1945; Hausleitner 2001; Iancu 2006) . Legal unification implied the uniformaization of the penal code as well as the creation of centralized law for the centralization of judicial organization (1924) (Goga 2006) . This process was continued under Communist rule (Veniamin 1956; Ciurea 1956; Graham 1982) , which ensured even stronger centralization of judicial training and practice, bureaucracy and law, based on the single dominant ideology. In the postCommunist Romania, high centralization persisted, and was to some extent even reinforced through the European influence, creating preconditions for adapting uniform judicial practices (Mendelski 2012) . Modern Romania has a centralized judiciary and a unified appeal process. Legal education at universities follows the same curricula so that besides the quality of the professors we can expect no regional differences. Thus, the differences between the Habsburg and the Ottoman territories in terms of legal practices and the composition of bureaucracy, which existed almost a century ago, are absent today.
Still, even in the environment of this strong centralization, there are reasons to hypothesize that the historical legacies could, to some extent, have persisted over time, due to the influence of informal institutions affecting the behavior of the litigants. Generally, the conjecture that demand for formal institutions (HerrmannPillath 1993; Leipold 2006) and law (Pistor 2002; Oleinik 2005) can be driven by historical factors or collective memory (Savelsberg and King 2007) has been widespread in the literature. The differences in the rule of law in the past could affect the informal institutions today, and as a result influence the demand for litigation. First, historical experience of the rule of law could affect the level of trust into government and governmental establishments. For instrumental behavior trust matters because it shapes expectations on how governments, bureaucrats and courts behave; for expressive behavior trust matters because it perception the interpretation of the court decisions by the society and by the defendant and, hence, the need to file an appeal for identity reasons. Second, experience of the past could influence how people perceive the fact that other people refuse to appeal or appeal in case they faced a criminal sentence. For example, if appeal is considered a way to reaffirm one's identity as an honest person by most people in the society, refusing to appeal may be interpreted as evidence of guilt by others (even more than the court's decision). Third, other informal practices are likely to be influenced by the legacies as well.
The reason for the survival of these informal institutions is the socialization via education and influence by family members, school, religious education and peer groups (see March and Olsen 1989; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Berger and Thomas 1967) . The socialization mechanisms imply that children imitate the behavior of their parents, educators and peers, but also that e.g. parents attempt to bring up their children according to cultural standards Verdier 2000, 2001) . For example, Putnam's (1993) logic suggests that the trust into governmental institutions is a by-product of high interpersonal trust. High interpersonal trust emerges very early in a person's life from what she learns in her family; it becomes basis for informal communities and associations created by people, and eventually affects the governance structures for the country. This socialization mechanism can survive various institutional reforms, because it happens within families, where communication remains largely unaffected, and because parents have preferences in preserving the cultural traits.
Family, however, is not the only source of the generalized trust and persistence of legacies. In fact, the family socialization argument suggests that in order to survive informal institutions need to be transferred through particular people with families living in the same region over long period of time. Since Romania has been subject to numerous migration waves during the first half of the 20th century, within-family socialization cannot be the only channel of survival of informal institutions. Thus, one has to ask which other sources of legacy survival could have played a role. Knack and Zack (2003) show that trust can be produced by educational system. Although the schooling system was subject to uniformization effort by the central government (in terms of content of education or curricula), one could suggest that the teaching practices remained different in spite of this homogenization (as far as the central rules were implemented by local personnel). Legacies can also be inherited through the reciprocal interaction within communities (Becker et al. 2011 ). This mechanism can be described as follows. Assume that at certain point of time a group of new migrants enters the community. If it is small enough, it will be socialized by the original population into certain norms and values. Hence, when at the later point another group of migrants enters (and part of the old population leaves), the migrants of the first wave will already fully embrace the existing norm, and will in turn contribute to the socialization of the migrants of the second wave according to it. Hence, if the number of migrants at every point of time is not large enough to entirely dilute the original population, the norm will persist.
Furthermore, in spite of the Romanization policy pursued by the interwar nationalist and the post-World War II Communist governments, there are still parts of Romania with large ethnic minorities ''inherited'' from the Habsburg past. In six of 41 counties of modern Romania ethnic Hungarians account for more than 20 % of the population, and in two their share exceeds 70 %. Ethnic minorities could be possibly even more prone to preserving the informal institutions, as the latter could also contribute to their feeling of self-identity. This is an issue, which could be subjected to empirical investigation. We will explicitly check for the presence of this channel of legacy transmission in our analysis, therefore contributing not only to the understanding of the functioning of legacies, but also of a possible mechanism of transmission of legacies.
The historical data indeed confirm that the differences between the Habsburg and the Ottoman parts of Romania persisted at least for several decades after the unification. In 1939, the appeal rates in the former Ottoman territories were three times higher than in Habsburg territories for all cases and two times higher for criminal cases (computation by the authors based on data from Institutul Central de Statistica 1940). However, in the 1940s the unification of law in Romania was not completed yet, unlike modern Romania with uniform law and centralized bureaucracy. In what follows, we will attempt to investigate the influence of the historical legacies on the demand for appeals in contemporary Romania.
Data and empirical model
In order to investigate the extent to which historical legacies affect the contemporary demand for litigation, we regress the number of cases in appellate courts on historical and contemporary factors. Our study is based on a dataset of the Romanian court statistics extracted from reports on the prosecutor's office activity. Our dependent variable in the main regression is the number of unresolved criminal cases as of 2008 processed by the prosecutors on the level of tribunals, i.e. the first levels of appeal. 8 The number of cases at the level of the courts of appeal is determined by two factors: the number of appeals submitted after the trial courts' decisions and the judicial quality and resources of the tribunals. One could conceptualize them as 'supply' and 'demand' sides of the appeal jurisprudence (see e.g. Murrell 2001 ). In Romania, one can argue that the supply-side of the judicial performance is homogenous due to the century-long centralization process and is unlikely to be correlated with the Habsburg legacies (particularly at the level of appeal courts with higher quality of judges); thus, the differences between tribunals should represent the demand-side effects, which we are interested in (we will, however, control for some proxies of judicial capacity as well).
For criminal cases, an important issue should be addressed. In the Romanian legal system, decisions of the trial courts can be appealed by both defendant and prosecutors. The incentives of the prosecutors may be very different from those of the defendant, and our theory referred primarily to the latter. Still, there are reasons to argue that this problem is less important for us. First, the trial courts' decision is in most cases in the favor of the prosecutor (the share of acquittals in Romania is, according to the data of the Supreme Council of Magistracy, close to 1-2 %), what is not unusual for the criminal jurisprudence of many post-Socialist countries. Thus, the prosecutors have low incentives to appeal anyway. Second, we can isolate effect 8 More specifically, we take the number of cases per position of the prosecutors at the tribunal level, i.e. number of prosecutors normatively assigned to the tribunal (some of these positions may be empty, as discussed in what follows). Thus, we are able to account for the size of the counties and the differences in judicial capacity to find out the actual demand for the appellate jurisprudence. As a caveat, we have to acknowledge that some of the cases processed by prosecutors may not be an outcome of the appeals but rather transferred for criminal investigation from lower-level prosecution offices to higher-level offices. However, for 2012 we have obtained data on both criminal cases considered by judges in tribunals and number of cases processed by prosecutors at the level of tribunals. One can show that both variables are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 86 %), and, as discussed below, cases arriving at the level of tribunals are mostly an outcome of appeal by accused. Thus, we can rely on our data for the purposes of research question of this study. of the defendant's behavior on appeals, using the following logic. Assume that there is a certain inflow of cases in the judicial system (generated, e.g. by the activity of the police). The behavior of courts and judges is homogenous across Romania, but so is the behavior of prosecutors. Hence, for a given number of trial court cases, the actions of prosecutors should generate roughly identical appeal rates in different parts of Romania. Therefore, if we observe variations in the number of cases in the tribunals ceteris paribus the number of cases in the trial courts and argue that the behavior of the prosecutors is the same in various counties in Romania, than the variation in the number of cases in the tribunals should be driven by the behavior of the defendant-which is precisely the dimension we are interested in. It implies, however, that we have to run our regressions controlling for the inflow of cases in the trial courts.
The behavior of the defendant, in turn, is likely to be influenced by the past historical legacies and the current development (contextual factors). The resulting differences in the judicial performance therefore represent the revealed demand for appellate litigation. It may be different from the pure ''preferences for'' and ''perception of'' the judicial system determined by legacies, as it also takes demandside constraints individuals face into account (e.g. resources they have to pursue litigation); this is, however, what we intend to capture using the control variables. Again, while informal norms could affect both the behavior of judges or prosecutors and the procedures in courts and the behavior of litigants, since the judicial system in Romania is highly centralized in terms of the training and appointment of personnel, these norms are more likely to explain variation in the behavior of the litigants (and thus, the demand for litigation) than that of judges.
Our sample includes a cross-section of 41 Romanian counties (we exclude Ilfov due to lack of data), which are the lowest level for which statistical data for Romania is available, and also the level tribunals operating at. There are two key explanatory variables in our analysis. One is the Habsburg dummy, equal to one for all counties originally belonging to the Austria-Hungary (using the borders as they have been determined at the onset of World War I) and zero otherwise. We attribute 17 countries to the Habsburg region, while the rest has been primarily under Ottoman (and for shorter periods Russian) influence. 9 Another variable is the income per capita in the region (measured by net nominal monthly earnings), reflecting the level of economic development. In all regressions, we control for the inflow of cases into the trial courts, using two approaches. First, we control for the crime rates measured by the number of cases investigated by law enforcement per capita. In Romania the number of investigations and of actual cases submitted to 9 Even the intra-country studies of legacies face two difficulties: first, which historical border exactly has to be used (border between Habsburg and Ottoman zones shifted over time), and second, how to deal with counties divided between Ottoman and Habsburg (since we do not have macroeconomic data for units smaller than county, we also cannot use them in our analysis). Until mid-nineteenth century the territories of Moldavia and Walachia (what we consider the ''Ottoman legacy'' zone) have partly fallen under Habsburg or Russian occupation for brief periods of time; however, no permanent long-lasting presence was established and therefore the impact of the Habsburg legacies ought to be much weaker than in Transylvania or even Bukovina (which was occupied in 1774). As for the borders of counties, we have attributed the counties, which have mostly belonged to Bukovina or Transylvania in terms of territory to the Habsburg zone. courts is very close, therefore this variable is a good proxy for the inflow of criminal cases. Second, we control for the actual number of the criminal cases in trial courts.
10
Reverse causality is absent for the Habsburg dummy (which reflects a centuryold variation across Romanian counties); it is also improbable for the monthly earnings. Nevertheless, for the income per capita it is necessary to account for the omitted variable bias. For this purpose, we add a set of further control variables to our regressions. 11 We look at the level of the overall development and economic situation in the region, measured by the regional population size and the level of unemployment. Furthermore, we control for the share of urban population, the share of ''blue collars'' (workers) in the region's workforce, as well as the share of different age groups (possibly representing both standard differences over cohorts, but also effects of the transition from Communist rule). We also control for the number of students in the post-secondary education, and for the dropout rate in the primary and secondary education. Both variables could be perceived as (rather crude) measures of quality of education in Romanian regions. The advantage of the first measure is that in Romania primary and secondary schooling still cover the main part of the population (if not the whole population). It is likely that some regions produce education services for other regions (i.e. students leave after completing their studies); still, high number of students still indicates higher level of human capital accumulated in the region (given the fact that the very educational services require professional staff). As for the dropout rate, this variable is more difficult to interpret. On the one hand, it might reflect the low quality of schooling. On the other hand, since the dropout rates are very low (less than 4 %) and given the period of our investigation, this indicator might capture another feature of the Romanian society in 2008: large emigration rates. Romania entered the European Union in 2007, and it resulted in an outflow of economically active population into other countries of the EU. Dropout rates might reflect the fact that students leave the country with their parents. In what follows, we will look at this interpretation more closely.
In addition to the main controls, we also run a set of regressions controlling for the total number of positions of judges in the tribunal; total number of the actually occupied positions of judges; and total number of the actually occupied positions of the prosecutors (there are some counties where the assigned number of positions was not filled), to further check for the supply side judicial capacity (while the training of judges and prosecutors is homogenous, there may be counties where simply more judges and prosecutors are available, what may affect the results). We also run a regression where we control for the total number of positions of prosecutors, though it may be excessive, because we already divide the dependent variable by the number of positions of prosecutors; it may be, however, that due to synergies in the prosecution staff the judicial capacity may be larger if the number of prosecutors is larger even in terms of how well each prosecutor is capable of handling his caseload. We also control for a proxy reported by the Supreme Council of Magistracy (the highest level body charged with ensuring the independence of the courts) on the efficiency of courts and prosecutor's offices in Romania, measuring the speed the cases are processed with.
12 This particular proxy is to some extent problematic since it may suffer from reverse causality in our investigation, but we still use it as a robustness check.
The interpretation of our results should include an important caveat. We argued that the possible differences in demand for litigation between the two parts of Romania could be driven by the persistence of informal institutions, which reflect the rule of law and judicial practices established during the Habsburg and the Ottoman rule. However, it is also possible that the differences between the two regions of Romania are not the outcome of policies of the eighteenth to nineteenth century, but are based on a much deeper cultural heterogeneity, which existed long before that. Modern territory of Romania was a place of encounter of various cultures and peoples for many centuries; some territories labeled as ''Habsburg'' in this study belonged to the Hungarian Kingdom at least since the ninth century, with Walachia and Moldova being established as independent states in the 13th century. Before, the Byzantine influence could have played a substantial role in the region. These long-term variations could have affected the level of trust, social norms and the relative importance of expressive vs. instrumental behavior and the institutional setting (or, more specifically, the success of institutional transplantation during different periods of time and the development of domestic law and legal practices), as well as the economic development and the income level. Unfortunately, tracing the historical legacies through such a long period of time empirically is extremely hard (particularly if our goal is to examine jurisprudence); but the possible role of these factors has to be acknowledged. Table 2 reports the main results of our study. If we merely include the Habsburg dummy in the set of covariates for the full sample of counties, this dummy turns out to be insignificant. If we add an interaction term between income and the Habsburg dummy, both Habsburg dummy and the interaction term are significant at 10 % level (what is acceptable given our very small sample). In order to properly analyze the influence of the Habsburg dummy on the demand for litigation for various levels of income in the presence of an interaction term, we compute marginal effects of the Habsburg legacies for various levels of income and estimate their significance, which is also reported in Table 2 for various specifications.
Results

Main results
One can see that in extremely poor counties the Habsburg dummy effect is negative and significant. It is particularly true (for most specifications) for counties with earnings below 850 lei: these are, specifically, Bihor, Calarasi, Covasna, 12 The efficiency of courts is available only for all cases, and not merely for criminal cases. Table 2 continued (8) Demand for litigation in the absence of traditions of rule of law Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1 % level; ** 5 % level; * 10 % level. Significant results marked bold. Since we are estimating our regressions for a very small sample of 41 counties, where the courts of appeal operate, we have to check for the normal distribution of residuals: we do it by calculating the Jarque-Bera test (J-B test) and excluding outliers with large residuals until we obtain normal distribution of residuals. Outliers are Vrancea in regression (1), (2); Vrancea, Iasi and Constanta in regression (4). After exclusion of outliers all effects related to Habsburg dummy keep their sign and significance. Marginal effects computed using the delta methods; note that the magnitude of marginal effects was computed using original coefficients before rounding up, while in the regression table coefficients are reported after rounding to the third sign after decimal mark Harghita, Maramures, Teleorman and Vasliu. Three of these counties belong to the Habsburg zone, and four to the Ottoman zone; hence, there is no reason to say that our results are driven merely by a small set of particular counties. It means that for poor counties we actually observe that Ottoman regions have higher demand for litigation than Habsburg regions. In some regressions we also find significant differences in the effects for very rich counties, where, on the contrary, Ottoman regions have lower number of cases than the Habsburg ones, but this effect is driven almost entirely by Bucharest (the county with the highest income per capita) and is much less robust.
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Hence, we were able to confirm that in poor counties the historical experience of deficit of rule of law is associated with higher demand for litigation. Our results are also consistent with the conjecture that legacies of the rule of law should be associated with increasing demand for litigation if income goes up, but in regions without experience of the rule of law income should not affect demand for litigation. The last hypothesis can also be tested using an alternative procedure. We split the sample into two groups of Ottoman and Habsburg counties, and estimate the regressions separately for each of them (the detailed regression results are available at request). In the Habsburg regions we find that the earnings have a strong, significant, and positive effect on the number of cases. In the Ottoman regions, on the contrary, earnings are insignificant. Thus, in the Ottoman regions the demand for litigation does not react on the growth of earnings, while it is influenced by earnings (in the way consistent with the theory) in the Habsburg regions. Plotting the unconditional correlation between the income per capita and the number of cases we come to the same conclusions (see Fig. 1 ).
Education and migration
In the next step, we interact the Habsburg dummy not only with the earnings per capita, but also with the dropout rates, and estimate a regression with triple interaction effects. If we plot marginal effects and levels of significance of the Habsburg dummy for different levels of income and of dropout rates, the results look as follows (figures and regression output available at request). For very small dropout rates (e.g. 1 %) we indeed observe the effects discussed and reported above, with significant and positive Habsburg impact for rich regions. If the dropout rates are high, the effects are not significant at all. Thus, one can conclude that the legacies matter only in counties with small dropout rates. This is an interesting observation, which is consistent with one of the interpretations for the dropout rates we have used so far-that is, as measure of emigration from individual counties caused by the European integration. Indeed, several factors, which should have generated differences between Habsburg and Ottoman regions in line with the Sect. 2, seem to be absent or much weaker in counties where larger fraction of the population emigrates or considers emigration. First, appeals done to use the random chance of success should be less frequent, if the individual plans to leave the country and thus does not plan for longterm litigation (particularly, in cases punished by fines, where it is possible to ''pay and go''). Second, concerns about disclosing one's income to the predatory state should be also lower, if there are plans to leave the country. Third, while expressive behavior based on confirming one's identity to oneself is not affected by migration decisions, if the expressive behavior attempts to confirm one's identity to others, it may be less important for those who intend to emigrate. This effect of emigration creates an additional problem for the interpretation of our results, which we need to discuss: the role of selection bias. The observed correlation between the Habsburg or Ottoman legacies and number of cases may be driven by an omitted variable correlated with both variables discussed: differences in migration rates. In order to deal with this problem, we have to show whether Habsburg or Ottoman regions differ in terms of migration rates. We look at two proxies: the official migration statistics of Romania, reporting the number of individuals shifting the permanent residence from Romania to other countries and available at county level, and data of the Open Society Institute (2006), based on a survey on temporary migration and available for several large historical regions. In both cases, there exists no difference between the Habsburg and the Ottoman counties in terms of the emigration rates (we have to rely on descriptive statistics for the Open Society Institute data and perform a t test of the equality of the means for official statistics); controlling for official emigration rates in the baseline regression does not change our results (details are available at request).
Hungarian minorities
Finally, we look at a specific channel of influence of legacies in Romania: The identified ''Habsburg legacies'' may be also associated with Hungarian minorities residing in several Romanian counties. We use the data from the Romanian Census of 2002, which report the share of ethnic Hungarians (partly forming the majority in some of the counties-all of them belong to the Habsburg group). First, we replicate our key findings replacing ''Habsburg dummy'' by ''share of Hungarians'', and find no effect for the interaction term. Second, we also re-estimate the key results including the Habsburg dummy and controlling for Hungarian dummy. Now, ''Habsburg'' results remain unchanged; share of Hungarian minorities has no effect. Finally, we form a variable equal to the share of non-Hungarian population in the former Habsburg regions and interact this variable and the share of Hungarian population separately with earnings. The effect seems to come only from the regions where Hungarian minority is small; so, the presence of the Hungarian minority as such does not cause the effect in question. If we control for other minorities indicated in the Census (which, however, rarely provide more than several percent of the population of the county), our results remain robust. To conclude, Habsburg effect does not seem to be driven by the persistence of particular minorities (econometric results available at request).
Discussion
The results we obtained fit very well a more general phenomenon, which we can refer to as the excessive demand for appellate litigation (the ''culture of appeals'') in countries with a weak judicial quality. There seems to be substantial evidence that people in countries, which lack an impartial and capable judiciary, are more likely to appeal than in countries with established tradition of the rule of law. According to the computations of the authors using the Council of Europe data on dismissal of cases (in all areas of law), the percentage of decisions subject to appeal are on average higher in Southeastern European countries (48 %) and post-Soviet countries (41 %) as compared to fewer appeals in Western Europe (30 %) or the more advanced post-communist countries from Central and Eastern Europe (27 %).
To investigate this issue further, we carried out a set of interviews with international (Council of Europe, European Court of Human Rights) and national representatives (in Romania). All interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2013. Almost all interviews we conducted confirm the existence of a ''culture of appeals'': A judge from the Constitutional Court explained the appeal culture with the ''mentality of Romanians to contest judicial verdicts''.
14 ''Citizens hope to achieve a more favourable verdict at a higher court level, irrespective if they are right or not''.
15 Judges also perceive the number of appeals to be very large. Citizens tend to appeal judicial decisions up to the highest court and when failing there, turn even to the Ministry of Justice (which is senseless) or to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). 16 Most interview partners argue that the main reasons for high appeal rates are to be found in the poor quality of the judicial system, which leads to a lack of citizens' trust in the system and more contestation of judgements. A lack of impartiality, high perceived corruption, low costs for trails and launching appeals contribute to the high demand for appellate litigation.
17 A lack of systemic impartiality is closely linked to the incoherent and constantly changing legislation. 18 Furthermore, politicians and the media with their permanent attacks and ''exaggerated'' critique of the Romanian judiciary decrease the trust of citizens into justice which in turn creates a ''culture to contest judicial decisions'' (this effect should be present in the Ottoman and in the Habsburg counties alike though). 19 This evidence seems to be consistent with the interpretation of appeals as attempts to use the perceived random nature of court decisions. Intentional delay, corruption and politicization also play an important role. Here we could speak of a misuse or instrumentalization of the appeal procedure.
20 Such common practices and the low condemnation rates in high-level corruption cases do not necessarily improve the citizens' trust into the judicial system. 21 We should note that the ''culture of appeals'' have been observed in other countries as well. A popular saying in Moldova (a country culturally and historically extremely close to contemporary Romania) is: ''I will go to the Pope in Rome, if necessary'' and can be translated as ''I will seek justice up to the ECHR''. 22 ,,Many litigants understand that they have small chances of success. However, the 'bad' jurisprudence inspires them''. In general, the ''quality of Moldovan judgements is bad. Therefore, the appeals are often used to correct the mistakes or to improve the reasoning of the lower courts. '' 23 Reasons for high rates of appeal are claimed to be high corruption, a lack of uniform practice, low professionalism of judges and 16 Interview with Gabriela Baltag, judge at the Neamt County Court, Piatra Neamt, 4 November 2010. lawyers as well as a poor understanding of the legislation by the lawyers/citizens. 24 Furthermore, professionalism and integrity of the layers matter: there is frequent ''abuse of lawyers, which often advise their clients in a manner incompatible to judicial practises''. There is also a certain ''tolerance of judges to and lack of deterrent measures against deliberate protraction of court proceedings'' which produces ''many appeals. '' 25 Finally, even though certain legal restrictions are present to inhibit appeals, it is relatively easy and inexpensive to lodge an appeal in practice. Judges generally tolerate appeals based on inadequate evidence in order to avoid accusations of restricting access to justice. 26 In Russia, in the same way, although the quality of courts is very bad and the probability of success is low, it is typical for lawsuits to end up in a sequence of appeals up to the highest possible level. Russian, Romanian, Turkish and Ukrainian citizens are known to be among the most active litigants at the ECHR. 27 This outcome is under no conditions a recent phenomenon. In Russia, active use of appeals, in spite of attempts of the government to discourage them, is claimed to have been observed since the eighteenth century (Muravyeva 2013) .
To conclude, our findings may relate to a phenomenon existing also beyond the Romanian borders. We have, however, to acknowledge that our specific explanations (e.g. frequent change of Phanariot rulers) are specific for Romania and were absent in other countries with weak rule of law we mentioned. In order to find out what served as substitutes of these practices in other countries, a more detailed analysis of their legal history is required, which, however, goes beyond the framework of this paper.
Conclusion
It remains to summarize the main findings of the paper. We have shown that Habsburg and Ottoman legacies have a substantial impact on the demand for litigation in modern Romania. The effect we find is, however, non-trivial. Although the previous research has shown that the Habsburg legacy is associated with higher trust in courts than the Ottoman one, we find that in poor counties Ottoman legacy is associated with larger number of cases than in rich counties. At the same time, in Habsburg counties the number of cases increases with income, while in Ottoman counties it exhibits very low change. We have also investigated one possible transmission mechanism of historical legacies: the role of ethnic minorities-and 27 Clearly, it is partly an outcome of very poor performances of the domestic judicial system (see ECHR 2009). However, it is also the case that the implementation of the ECHR decisions is in many cases questionable and excessively delayed (especially in the non-democratic Russia), so, the instrumental logic of appeals to the ECHR may be contested.
find that the Habsburg legacies are present even in regions with smaller Hungarian minorities. Thus, it makes other channels of transmission of legacies, like the interaction within local communities, more plausible; further investigation, however, is required in this respect.
The findings of the paper contribute to several fields of study. First, our work relates to the debate on the persistence of historical legacies in general. First, our main argument is that the impact of these historical factors might be conditional on contemporaneous characteristics of the regions and be entirely different (in fact, the opposite), for, for example, poor and rich jurisdictions. It could shed further light on partly extremely contradictory conclusions made in the literature regarding the effect of legacies; the same effects have been used to explain highly contradictory behavior. While these discrepancies are typically explained by the poor operationalization of legacies, we argue that the can be driven by the fact that the same legacies do have different consequences, depending on the context in which they are embedded. Second, we show that the legacies can persist even in spite of lack of continuity of population; in fact, we show that in parts of Romania where this migration was weaker (larger Hungarian population persisted), there is no evidence of stronger persistence of legacies.
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Second, we contribute to the growing literature on the pre-Communist legacies in the Central and Eastern Europe and, more specifically, on the Ottoman and Habsburg legacies. First, we confirm the result already established in several other studies and show that pre-Communist legacies still have an influence on the social development of these countries, but for a previously unexplored area (demand for litigation). Second, our study suggests that the historical legacies under investigation require very careful identification. In the Romanian case, we indeed see that the Ottoman legacy matters-however, the Ottoman legacy in the jurisprudence of the Romanian principalities seems to be very different from the Ottoman legacy, as it was observed in parts of the Balkans under direct rule of the Empire. While some features are similar (weak rule of law, high corruption and arbitrariness of jurisprudence), others are strikingly dissimilar-appeals, which did not exist or were strongly discouraged in the Ottoman jurisprudence (Kuran and Lustig 2012) , were highly encouraged in Romanian vassal states. Also, specific institutions of the Islamic law (Kuran 2011) were absent in the Phanariot states (where both the population and the appointed rulers were Orthodox Christians). Thus, Ottoman legacies (e.g. indirect rule through Phanariots in Romania) are not equal to Ottoman legacies (e.g. direct rule in most other Ottoman territories). 29 In the same way, Russian, Habsburg or Prussian legacies could hypothetically be different depending on the particular mode of governance these empires used in different territories. While our study looks only at one case (Romania), it suggests that it is necessary not only to compare legacies of different empires, but of different rules within these empires.
Third, our results may have certain policy implications for the discussion of the judicial reform in Central and Eastern Europe (and, particularly, Romania), which belongs to the key challenges these countries face. As mentioned in the introduction, high number of appeals may have both positive and negative implications for the social and economic development. Generally, it is impossible to use the standards of behavior, which evolved in some societies, to evaluate the behavior in other ones. The high number of appeals or engagement in corruption networks in the Ottoman principalities should not be interpreted as evidence of sub-optimal behavior; on the contrary, they can be seen as evidence of optimal adjustment to the particular environment of a predatory state. However, these patterns seem to persist in the modern Romania with highly centralized and uniform judiciary. Despite certain deficiencies, the appeal process, while abused in the past, works relatively well in contemporary Romania. Under these conditions, propensity of population to frequently appeal even in cases with very low chances of success may result in the growing burden on the judiciary, which in turn could make it less efficient. This could lead to a vicious circle: inefficient judiciary leads to high randomness in decisions, and it again is one of the factors leading to growing number of appeals (for a related discussion see Hendley 2013) . The policy responses to these challenges constitute an important field of further research.
